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ABSTRACT
Security tasks can burden the individual, to the extent that
security fatigue promotes habits that undermine security.
Here we revisit a series of user-centred studies which focus
on security mechanisms as part of regular routines, such as
two-factor authentication. By examining routine security
behaviours, these studies expose perceived contributors and
consequences of security fatigue, and the strategies that a
person may adopt when feeling overburdened by security.
Behaviours and strategies are framed according to a model
of cognitive control modes, to explore the role of human per-
formance and error in producing security fatigue. Security
tasks are then considered in terms of modes such as un-
conscious routines and knowledge-based ad-hoc approaches.
Conscious attention can support adaptation to novel secu-
rity situations, but is error-prone and tiring; both simple se-
curity routines and technology-driven automation can min-
imise effort, but may miss cues from the environment that
a nuanced response is required.
1. INTRODUCTION
Individuals perform a number of security tasks in their daily
lives, both private and professional. These tasks support
some primary activity, towards a personal goal such as pur-
chasing an event ticket, or as part of their efforts to comply
with an employer’s security policies.
There is cognitive – as well as physical – effort associated
with each security task. The demands of a task may be
excessive or perceived as ill-fitting, promoting the develop-
ment of coping strategies [11]. This avoidance of effort may
in fact be rational when limited personal gains are attached
to the security task as perceived by the individual [3]. For
instance, exhaustively checking characteristics of a website
to identify malicious content does not guarantee that the
site is benign.
In organisations, security mechanisms and policies are pro-
vided to inform secure behaviours. A person might expend
security effort for the benefit of others around them and the
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organisation as a whole [1]. Cumulative effort from bur-
densome or repetitive security tasks can push an individual
past a point where it is then harder for the organisation to
encourage a return to good security behaviours. This com-
pliance threshold exemplifies what may be termed security
fatigue.
Aside from the immediate cognitive and physical demands
of security, the consequences of committing effort to both
successful and failed security activities can promote avoid-
ance of those same associated personal costs [1]. These costs
can include potential embarrassment in the presence of oth-
ers (should failure occur), and missed opportunities if the
security effort associated with a task is excessive.
A number of related studies have directly explored ways to
characterise effort associated with security tasks, and the
consequences of excessively burdensome security (Section 2).
Here we revisit a set of user-centred studies, all driven by
a consideration of the tensions between primary tasks and
the perceived effort associated with enabling security tasks.
These include use of CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) [6],
and interaction with security policies and security culture
in large organisations [1, 4]. Studies are considered as a
means to identify the elements of security which are per-
ceived as effortful, both when interacting with individual
security mechanisms (Section 3) and combinations of mech-
anisms (Section 4) as part of day-to-day activities. Studies
also allude to the consequences (Section 5), both perceived
and actual, of effortful security and security fatigue.
Security tasks can drain individuals’ ‘energy reservoir’ [8] by
demanding conscious, laboured cognitive effort. We explore
the role of individual performance in security (Section 6), by
way of James Reason’s model of cognitive control modes [9].
This model differentiates between different families of tasks,
which place distinct demands upon the individual’s memory
and capabilities. These can include routine, unconscious
tasks and novel problems which require conscious effort to
produce ad-hoc solutions. We reframe this model to consider
secondary, security tasks; effortful security can be tiring and
error-prone, whereas habitual security routines require ex-
perience and training. Here we also consider the impact
of cumulative security demands across a collection of secu-
rity mechanisms and institutional support for the individual
(such as IT helpdesks). Conclusions are then drawn in Sec-
tion 7, summarising recommendations to practitioners and
researchers.
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2. RELATED WORK
A number of works have explored various dimensions of se-
curity effort, and the consequences of that effort when it
becomes too great for the individual. These works often use
insights from other disciplines to explore security fatigue and
its causes.
The Compliance Budget [1] applies security economics prin-
ciples to consider the costs and benefits for employees in
expending effort for the benefit of the organisation. This
encapsulates the challenge for organisations to moderate the
security demands placed upon employees, to encourage com-
pliance and commit resources to support that compliance.
Individuals expend effort altruistically for the benefit of the
organisation, but security policies should consider that there
is almost a fixed amount of goodwill available before the
compliance threshold is passed; security that is effortful, re-
peated over and over during the day, or generally does not
adequately consider the user will drain the budget more.
Upon reaching what we might refer to here as ‘compliance
fatigue’, the individual may resort to workarounds and cop-
ing strategies with greater frequency, and the organisation
must invest ever greater resources to promote secure work-
ing practices. Here we explore similar thresholds as a trigger
to less secure routines.
Cranor [2] devises a framework which considers usability re-
quirements as part of security design; if human participation
is necessary for security, there are factors to account for to
support a successful outcome. Factors such as interference
to tasks and switching attention between tasks can impact
the user, making it more difficult to avoid security breaches.
Here we consider the impact of cumulative effort upon the
individual, where a fatigued state can result in insecure out-
comes.
Work by Pfleeger et al. [8] leverages behavioural sciences
concepts, such as moral values and habit formation; here we
have considered complementary works from the domain of
safety. Pfleeger et al. consider habit formation and related
constructs as a means to improve provisioning of security
awareness support for individuals. Development of more
effective security routines is seen as one means of improving
individual security behaviour. Relating to the intentions of
this paper, Pfleeger et al. allude to “user’s energy” and how
tasks should be arranged so as to make best use of it.
Renaud [10] considers that security policies in organisations
have an effect of placing unrealistic demands upon employ-
ees. A survey of 328 employees of the UK National Health
Service (NHS) found that the majority of employees would
feel stress and an inability to cope should security policies
require them to change their routines. Survey respondents
perceived that policies did not recognise the demands placed
upon them. Here we consider that security effort should be
expected in the right way at the right time, in order to limit
the emergence of security fatigue.
3. INDIVIDUAL SECURITY ROUTINES
The authors have been variously involved with a number
of related security usability studies. Each study examined
the ease-of-use of existing security mechanisms. Studies also
explored participants’ perception of effort related to use of
security technologies to support particular primary tasks.
The studies include:
• A diary study exploring the burden of authentication
tokens upon employees in a large governmental organ-
isation [12, 13].
• Interviews and a diary study with members of the pub-
lic, exploring how individuals manage authentication
tokens for online banking [7].
• Usage scenarios and follow-on interviews looking at hu-
man verification technologies such as CAPTCHAs, and
candidate replacement technologies including a game
and a face recognition solution [6].
Here we revisit the original study results, to consider themes
relating to security fatigue, the cognitive and physical de-
mands that are associated with each mechanism, and how
individuals respond to excessive security expectations.
3.1 Two-factor authentication
Diary studies of authentication [12, 13] showed that partic-
ipants disliked one-time credentials as they made the login
procedure disruptive, since the password entry could not be
automated. P11 explained:
“And it’s not something that you just have
memorized that you just can do automatically.
Again, it’s that sort of effortful, I have to get the
device. I have to look at it. I have to copy what it
says into my computer, and then enter my pass-
word. If it was just me entering my password it
wouldn’t be as big of a deal. [. . . ] It’s that delib-
erate effortful, conscientious. . . I really have to
stop what I’m doing and think about it. Whereas
if you’re just doing something from muscle mem-
ory, you don’t really even have to think about
that.”
The study found that employees would variously batch tasks
to avoid interaction with security, or avoid security tasks –
and the actual services they support – altogether. This had
an impact on productivity as P6 explained:
“To me, the way that security impacts work is
not that I waste a few seconds typing in a pass-
word, but it is these things that you just can’t do
because of the limitations of security policy. [. . . ]
I can think of cases when I have thought it would
be really nice to include some person at another
university on a software development project, but
then I realize it is going to be such a tremendous
pain to organize that.”
Fatigue can also occur when users feel that the level of se-
curity is not appropriate to the level or risk and the related
effort is thus excessive. P19 noted:
“If you’re working for the CIA or a hospital
with patient records, maybe I could understand
that. [. . . ] Nothing we do is sensitive. Every-
thing is public, so they can get it anyways. It
doesn’t make any sense.”
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These themes are echoed in interviews with customers who
have used security features of online personal banking [7].
One participant found online banking authentication proce-
dures to be excessive compared to oﬄine transactions where
a four-digit PIN is needed to authorise a card payment; as
another participant explained:
“It feels like if you add that step, or another
machine or a special card reader, it feels like when
does it end?”
As in the previous study, some participants felt that hard-
ware tokens were added to online banking not to improve
actual security, but perceived security, P01 explained:
“I think at the time there has been a lot of
fear of online banking – and a lot of people were
afraid of getting their account compromised [. . . ]
I think that it was done to give the appearance to
those using online banking, or all those new to
online banking that it was secure.”
3.2 Human verification
Similarly in the study of candidate CAPTCHA replacement
mechanisms [6], a participant was annoyed with a security
measure if they felt it was excessive:
“it’s not important enough for just contribut-
ing to an online forum, if you start adding stats
for everything you’re not going to enjoy your ex-
perience of the Internet. . . it’s already annoy-
ing when Facebook tells me you are connecting
from another computer, I think – Just let me be!”
(P15)
A face biometric alternative was also assessed – participants
did not feel that they could influence the outcome of the
process, regardless of how much effort they may exert, cre-
ating a stressful situation. It was perceived that individuals
had control over CAPTCHAs and that they can always ‘try
harder’ to read characters correctly. If an individual feels
that reaching their goal is not guaranteed, they may switch
to a procedure where they are more able to influence the
perceived outcome.
Fatigue happens when users need to engage in tasks repeat-
edly while believing that these tasks should be automated,
essentially that “The computer should know it’s me.” Sim-
ilarly, in the authentication study conducted in a govern-
mental organisation [12, 13], P18 explained:
“Well, I think that if I just logged in, then
it should be able to understand that I just logged
in and not ask me for the password again. [. . . ]
That’s too much, because you shouldn’t have to
do extra work to authenticate.”
4. FATIGUE ACROSS COMPETING ROU-
TINES
A number of studies conducted by the authors have also
examined security effort in environments where individuals
must manage many security controls as part of their regular
activities, and the associated competing demands.
The study examining use of authentication tokens for online
banking [7] (as discussed in the previous section) considered
the impact of managing multiple bank accounts. These ac-
counts were found to differ so much in their definition and
use of authentication terminology and devices that mov-
ing attention between accounts was burdensome for indi-
viduals. The need to provide multiple credentials also lim-
ited how much individuals were able to develop automated
banking authentication habits; one consequence of this was
that at least one participant moved their banking to another
provider. In this case, it took too much conscious effort to
be prepared for interacting with – and switching between
– a number of tasks which are in essence repetitive. P14
complained logging in to online banking required conscious
effort and an attention switch:
“I’ll have to get myself together mentally and
let’s say: ‘Focus! Whatever is in your mind, for-
get it.’ ”
Large organisations often use security policies to dictate how
security should be managed for provisioned IT systems. This
extends to the expectations placed upon employees, in terms
of how they should use the infrastructure. An organisation
normally also provides support for use of IT, and policies
will describe how and when support mechanisms should be
called upon. An analysis of more than 100 interviews with
employees in various roles in a large organisation uncovered
many sources of security burden [5]. Proscribed security
tasks which distracted from the main work activity would
be circumvented, but notably replaced with lower-impact
alternatives, sourced from within and outside the organi-
sation, which could be more easily adopted as part of less
effortful routines by the individual (e.g., maintaining local
copies of files if VPN services were too cumbersome).
At times, the support the organisation had put in place was
not adequate, meaning that any and all effort a person could
exert to reach a successful outcome would be for nothing:
“I’ve actually had to go home because there
was no one in the building I knew to let me in. . . we
could do with say a sign-in procedure or an alter-
native approach. It was just too much hassle.”
In other cases, high cognitive load related to managing pass-
words for multiple corporate accounts resulted not only in
passwords being recorded to aid future recall, but effort
then being exerted to provide some approximation of secu-
rity for those same records (e.g., a password-protected text
file). Employees were conscious of a need for security, and
developed solutions based upon their own approximation
of good security practices, sometimes without the aware-
ness or active involvement of the security function, referred
to as shadow security practices. Security mechanisms may
otherwise outright block the main work activity, whereas
workarounds were not without effort demands of their own,
such as renaming files to circumvent restrictions on file ac-
cess. Critically, individuals are exerting effort to simplify
the task and maintain a sense of control towards a particular
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outcome, while also preserving some sense that productive
tasks are still being conducted securely.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FATIGUE
5.1 Sources of fatigue
The previous two sections – and the studies they touch upon
– have demonstrated that there are a number of sources of
perceived security fatigue:
• Excessive cognitive load. Recalling passwords, re-
calling the steps of a complicated security process.
• Excessive physical load and preparedness. Re-
membering in advance to carry an authentication to-
ken, and coordinating its timely use as a part of a
security process [12, 7].
• Distraction from time-sensitive tasks. Work pres-
sures can make security demands seem more burden-
some [1].
• Blocking of tasks and missed opportunities. Wait-
ing for IT support to resolve issues, avoiding new busi-
ness partnerships because setting up secure IT access
seems too troublesome [12].
• Potential embarrassment. The possibility of being
unable to access data in the presence of a client adds
excessive stress to the process [1].
5.2 Responses to fatigue
Related studies also identified potential responses to secu-
rity fatigue. These responses may inspire changes to habits
should security effort cross a threshold and be perceived as
too much to justify maintaining proscribed behaviour:
5.2.1 Types of compliance
• Continued goodwill. This is the starting position,
which in an organisation can be regarded as altruism
for the greater good of all individuals in that organisa-
tion [1]. An appropriate number of tasks to perform,
that support diligence. The individual will do what
they are asked to do in the name of security, by rote,
because it is reasonable and achievable.
• Grudging compliance. Continued, visible compli-
ance with security expectations, but only because tech-
nology is constraining behaviour. Critically, this be-
haviour may be indistinguishable from security good-
will if the impact on productivity is not also visible [1]
(an individual appears to be complying with policy,
but their productive tasks are suffering an impact else-
where).
• Shadow security. Where policy or guidance is not
visible – or is not descriptive enough to guide behaviour
– individuals may create security solutions of their
own. These solutions leverage individuals’ own ex-
isting knowledge of security, and may develop in re-
sponse to immediate needs or persistently effortful se-
curity that is imposed upon them. Crucially, shadow
security [4] happens because people want to behave se-
curely, but take action on their own (or collectively in
groups) to manage security fatigue and develop work-
able, repeatable solutions that can be called upon to
address recurring security challenges. Rather than be-
ing an act of pushing back against security, shadow
security is an attempt to match security effort to the
task in the absence of external support.
• Sub-optimal compliance. Examples focus on ‘batch-
ing’ of tasks [13, 12] as further described in 5.2.2. Pro-
ductive tasks are performed at times which are sub-
optimal, to reduce the need to carry out effortful secu-
rity routines that are wrapped around any one access
to a particular system. Technically compliant with se-
curity, but the value of security for the process is di-
minished – an example would be logging in to a system
at the end of the day to perform multiple data entry
tasks which could have been carried out at any time,
meaning data enters the system later than it normally
would.
• Learned resignation. Too few tasks to perform. It
may not be appropriate to limit individuals’ involve-
ment in their own security [14]. Waiting for face recog-
nition technology to decide whether a person is a hu-
man or not is one example [6]. This has the same fun-
damental dilemma as potential embarrassment, where
here a person may experience stress at the possible
outcome for lack of being able to do anything else to
influence the end result.
5.2.2 Coping strategies and workarounds
Users develop coping strategies and workarounds to manage
the security effort required from them. Users modify charac-
teristics of the task to make repeated application of a routine
that is known to support reaching the primary goal without
risk of their work being blocked by security. Coping strate-
gies mean that users reorganise their work and security task
through for example batching logins. When batching logins,
users do not log in to a system as they need it for their work
but batch multiple activities that need to be done on a sys-
tem to reduce the number of login procedures required. One
type of a coping strategy can be disengagement where indi-
viduals abandon or avoid the use of technologies or services
altogether [13]. This can include workarounds, and indeed
avoidance of the productive task that security was intended
to support.
An example of a workaround is when users decide to switch
to an alternative to the advocated technology. This can in-
clude other security mechanisms (e.g., transfer files on an
encrypted USB stick instead of via a file-share), or ‘home-
made’, shadow security solutions leveraging a personal ap-
proximation of security [4] (such as a password-protected
record of passwords, kept on a personal machine which never
leaves the office). These may be workarounds, but also
appropriations of other technologies advocated in policy.
Banking customers may use an account less often or switch
to a different provider altogether [7].
6. COGNITIVE CONTROL MODES AND SE-
CURITY FATIGUE
Many of the sources of security fatigue are cognitive. Indi-
viduals will act to automate security, or otherwise develop
workable, repeatable security habits which are ensured to
reach a successful outcome.
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Figure 1: Three levels of performance control
(adapted from Reason [9]).
James Reason has previously defined a framework (see Fig-
ure 1) to explain how individuals apply cognitive effort to-
wards completion of tasks. Given a focus on safety and the
reduction of errors in practice, the framework considers the
consequences when badly-fitting tasks place improper de-
mands upon an individual’s memory. This model can frame
how an individual rationally moves to a different default re-
sponse to minimise the sense of fatigue and reach a successful
outcome for the primary task, especially within the security
domain (a range of default positions were explored in the
previous section).
Knowledge-based performance applies conscious attention to
a task. This approach is adaptive to the situation, but effort-
ful, tiring, and – critically for creating a consistent, workable
security environment – it is not what humans typically prefer
to do, and can be extremely error-prone. In novel situations
where there is no clear advice or known solution, knowledge-
based performance may be the only approach available.
Skill-based performance supports conscious pursuit of goals
with automatic actions, such that the enabling activity is
near-unconscious. Automatic habits reduce the need to ex-
pend cognitive effort in the completion of a range of tasks;
however, absent-mindedness can still occur if the circum-
stances of the setting do not fit application of the learned
behaviour. Application of learned behaviours may be chal-
lenged in times of increased pressure, such as time-sensitive
tasks (as in Section 5).
Rule-based performance considers circumstances specific to
the activity, then selecting a pre-packaged solution that ap-
plies to those circumstances. This is supported by experi-
ence and training; for security, if bad habits develop which
nonetheless manage burden and fatigue, they then become
part of the repertoire of solutions that a person can call upon
in the future. The need to apply rules can also be missed;
this may occur if the role of security in the main activity has
not been made clear. Similarly, if a person is not adequately
prepared for the situation, they have to resort to effortful,
tiring conscious thought.
6.1 Security fatigue across performance lev-
els
Reflecting upon the model of cognitive control modes, Rea-
son builds an argument that fatigue contributes to task er-
rors. It is then important to ensure that security effort fits
the task, otherwise individuals are likely to be placed in
a situation where they are more likely to make a mistake.
Conversely, habits may develop to reach a desired goal, and
the habit hardly revisited to determine if it requires rules or
knowledge. An example would be regarding browser warn-
ings as a routine (clicking through all prompts) when the
process is intended as a trained-for problem, albeit lack-
ing the training that would normally prepare a person with
established routines to call upon. An insecure skill-based
approach is hard to shift, so it is necessary to establish good
security habits which will genuinely prepare the individual
for the situation in which they are applied, but which will
also moderate security effort from first application onwards.
Reason argues that the human mind will defer to automatic
practices whenever possible, which is then error-prone in
itself. Solutions will fall between treating a situation like
a similar one, and deferring to the most often used solu-
tion. Stressful situations promote use of reliable approaches
which were felt to work well in the past – in this sense,
security tasks which may create embarrassment or inconsis-
tent outcomes should be re-evaluated, as should tasks which
leave users uninformed and disconnected from what is hap-
pening during the process. Considering collections of tasks
(Section 4), if all security tasks demand conscious effort, a
person may become tired more rapidly.
Use of passwords as an authentication credential is in some
sense intended to be simple and effortless, in essence a skill-
based task. However, this does not scale as it requires rule-
based thinking for an individual to recall their password
composition strategies and simply which password applies to
which account. Knowledge-based approaches may even be
required if a password strategy cannot be recalled; ad-hoc so-
lutions can include borrowing another person’s account cre-
dentials, or embarking on an unfamiliar password-resetting
process.
Security technology may at times serve to automate effort
on behalf of the user, akin to how humans may themselves
automate a task. Automation of security effort in technology
may seem like a virtuous solution, taking burden away from
the individual. However, if the automation does not for
instance support rule-based performance, the completion of
trained-for problems is made more difficult; the individual
may assess a situation as requiring input on their part, but
the act of putting cognition into action is removed from them
– conscious effort will not change the result. This can for
example include the need to call on IT support to resolve
an issue; if the support is not timely, there is nothing the
individual can do, and they may avoid tasks which require
particular technologies.
Reason’s framework also illustrates that some effort is neces-
sary and acknowledged in the way that tasks leverage mem-
ory and situational cues. Different modes of performance
can be employed to guarantee a satisfactory (read, secure)
outcome with a level of conscious effort that fits the task.
Fatigue is then damaging because it changes the control
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mode, and consequently how the task is interpreted and
addressed by the individual over time. People do not ac-
tively default to ignoring security on every occasion, but
instead are defaulting to an established approach which sat-
isfies completion of the primary goal. Security fatigue also
puts individuals at risk of making mistakes, not least if they
feel drained and exhausted by security, but by forcing a de-
liberate, error-prone approach, sometimes without the facili-
ties available to find a suitable – secure – solution. If the task
is designed badly, new stimuli forces effortful, error-prone,
conscious evaluation of the task. If practitioners do not
want there to be errors, it is necessary to design a security
task properly according to how it leverages the individual’s
memory (learned responses) and capacity to interpret in-situ
stimuli; context-of-use is then important as it can determine
the capacity to reach a successful outcome.
7. CONCLUSION
We revisit a small set of user-centred studies of security
mechanisms, identifying routines and consequences of fa-
tigue for the individual. Strategies that are adopted to man-
age security fatigue are also identified. Contributors and
consequences of security fatigue are then framed in terms
of cognitive control modes, using a framework initially de-
veloped by James Reason to explore task safety and human
performance.
We find that security fatigue can have implications for both
the management of security, and for the cognitive approach
an individual may adopt when faced with a particular se-
curity task – fatigue can change the way individuals apply
conscious and unconscious effort to reach their goals. Se-
curity fatigue may also change how memory and skills are
called upon, if the task is not simple; conversely, if a task
proves difficult, without a repertoire of available solutions in
mind, a person will resort to effortful adaptive thinking to
find a solution.
If practitioners seek to provide workable security, it is neces-
sary to minimise error-prone and tiring conscious effort, but
to balance this with a need to anticipate the structure of
security tasks – automation of security is laudable but not
always appropriate. Routine tasks can be completed with re-
duced cognitive effort, but are disrupted if situational cues
arise which are not anticipated as being part of the task,
creating a sense of security fatigue for the individual. Re-
searchers examining security fatigue may wish to consider
the points at which security tasks involve the individual,
and where a task should make appropriate use of their ca-
pabilities. This then informs where support should be pro-
vided, either in preparing the individual with relevant skills
or in the development of novel, simplified processes. The
key to reducing security fatigue is to ensure that individu-
als feel prepared, supported, and unburdened; providers of
user-facing security solutions need to prepare the individ-
ual for security tasks in such a way that technology, process
and skill are all parts of a complete – arguably inseparable
– package.
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